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Introduction
There are many situations where decision makers do not have full information about the environment in which they operate. Firms, for example, might not know relevant characteristics of their environment such as how the demand for their good depends on the price they charge, how it is aected by their competitors, who their competitors are and how they behave. Learning has a natural role in these situations: agents gather the information resulting from their actions, they evaluate it and take it into account when making a decision.
There exists a wide variety of methods for modeling learning in the economics literature, including dierent belief-based models, least squares learning and evolutionary methods. Fudenberg and Levine (1998) , Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Cressman (2003) give good overviews of these classes. Dierent methods may lead to dierent outcomes. This is illustrated in Oerman et al. (2002) , for example: they consider two imitation-based and a belief-based learning rule that lead to dierent market outcomes theoretically as well as in a laboratory experiment in a Cournot oligopoly with three rms. This shows that it is essential to explicitly model the agents' learning behavior. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of agents should also be taken into account. Agents may prefer dierent learning methods (due to dierences in computational abilities, for example) for nding out what the optimal decision is. In fact, Stahl (1996) nds experimental evidence both for heterogeneity among individuals and for switching to rules that performed better in the past. Therefore, it is important to analyze what happens in a heterogeneous environment and how dierent learning methods aect each other.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the interaction between two dierent learning methods in a heterogeneous setting where decision makers dier in the method they use. The relevance of this issue is that the convergence properties of a learning method might be aected by the presence of another method. For instance, a method that is capable of nding the Nash equilibrium in a homogeneous setting might lead to a dierent outcome in a heterogeneous environment. Furthermore, if dierent methods lead to dierent outcomes in a homogeneous setting, then it is unclear what will happen in a heterogeneous environment.
As a framework of the analysis we consider a Bertrand oligopoly with dierentiated goods. Firms do not have full information about the market: they do not fully know the demand they face. They may use one of two dierent well known learning methods for deciding on the price of their good. The rst method is least squares learning. With this method rms approximate their demand function with a linear function that depends only on their own price. Then they use this estimated demand function to decide on the price and they update the coecients in the approximation in every period. Least squares learning is a natural learning method in this setup: when the relation between some variables is unknown, then it is natural to specify a regression on the variables and to use the estimates for decision making. In our model the approximation the rms may apply is misspecied in two ways: not all the relevant variables, i.e. the prices of the other rms, are included in the regression and the functional form is incorrect. The other learning method we consider is gradient learning. With this method rms use information about the slope of their prot function for modifying their current price. Gradient learning captures the idea that rms systematically change the price of their good in the direction in which they expect to earn a higher prot.
Locally stable xed points of gradient learning correspond to local prot maxima, therefore it is natural to use it in the setting we consider. We analyze OLS and gradient learning for the following reasons.
Both of them are reasonable methods in the environment we consider and, as we will see, they have been applied in the literature of oligopolistic markets. In the model we assume that rms do not observe either prices set by other rms or the corresponding demands. Therefore, it is an important criterion that the learning methods should use information only about the rms' own prices and demands. Both OLS and gradient learning are appropriate in this sense. Moreover, they result in dierent market outcomes in a homogeneous setting, so it is not clear what kind of outcome will be observed when some rms apply OLS learning while others use gradient learning and when rms are allowed to switch between the learning methods. One method may drive the other one out of the market when endogenous switching between the methods is introduced.
We address the following questions in this paper. How do the two learning methods aect each other in a heterogeneous environment? Do the dynamical properties of the model depend on the distribution of learning methods over rms? If the properties of the methods vary with respect to this distribution, can we observe cycles in which the majority of rms apply the same learning method and later they switch to the other one? Can one method drive out the other one? We study these questions with formal analysis and with computer simulations. We nd that the learning methods we consider lead to dierent market outcomes in a homogeneous setting. With least squares learning, rms move towards a so-called self-sustaining equilibrium, as introduced by Brousseau and Kirman (1992) , in which the perceived and the actual demands coincide at the price charged by the rms. The learning method does not have a unique steady state; the initial conditions determine which point is reached in the end. In contrast, if gradient learning converges, it leads to the Nash equilibrium of the market structure we consider. 1 However, gradient learning may not always converge and then we observe high-period cycles or quasi-periodic dynamics. In a heterogeneous setting with xed learning rules, OLS learners move towards a self-sustaining equilibrium 1 In general, gradient learning may converge to local prot maxima that are not globally optimal. Bonanno and Zeeman (1985) and Bonanno (1988) call this kind of outcomes local Nash equilibria. In the market structure we consider there is a unique local prot maximum so gradient learning leads to the Nash equilibrium if it converges. in which gradient learners give the best response to the price set by all other rms when gradient learning converges. The convergence properties of gradient learning depend on the distribution of learning methods over rms: an increase in the number of gradient learners can have a destabilizing eect. When endogenous switching between the learning rules in introduced, then a stable gradient learning does not necessarily drive out OLS learning. Some OLS learners may earn a higher prot than they would make as a gradient learner and then they would not switch to gradient learning. However, OLS learning may drive out gradient learning when the latter is unstable. An interesting cyclical switching can occur when the convergence properties of gradient learning change as the distribution of learning methods over rms varies. When gradient learning converges, gradient learners typically earn more than the average prot of OLS learners.
This gives an incentive for OLS learners to switch to gradient learning. An increase in the number of gradient learners, however, typically destabilizes gradient learning, resulting in low prots for gradient learners so they may start switching back to OLS learning. At some point, gradient learning will converge again and the process may repeat itself.
Our paper builds upon and contributes to several recent streams of literature on learning in economics.
Least squares learning, for example, is widely used in the economics literature. The model we consider is closely related to the model of Kirman (1983) and Brousseau and Kirman (1992) . These papers analyze the properties of misspecied OLS learning in a Bertrand duopoly with dierentiated goods under a linear demand specication. The learning method they use is misspecied as rms focus on their own price eect only. In this paper we generalize some results of Kirman (1983) to the case of n rms under a nonlinear demand specication. Gates et al. (1977) consider least squares learning in a Cournot oligopoly. Each rm regresses its average prots on its outputs and uses the estimated function to determine the output for the next period. The learning method the authors consider diers from ours in two respects. First, each observation has the same weight in our model whereas rms weigh observations dierently in Gates et al. (1977) . Second, the rms' action is specied as the action that maximizes the one-period expected prot in our paper. In Gates et al. (1977) the next action is the weighted average of the previous action and the action that maximizes the estimated prot function. Tuinstra (2004) considers the same kind of model that is studied in this paper. The rms use a misspecied demand function but a dierent learning method is applied. When posting a price, rms are assumed to observe the demand for their good and the slope of the true demand function at that price. Then they estimate the demand function by a linear function that matches the demand and the slope the rms faced. For the estimation rms use only the most recent observation. Firms will then use the new estimates for determining the price in the next period. Tuinstra (2004) analyzes the dynamical properties of this model and shows that complicated dynamical behavior can occur depending on the cross-price eects and the curvature of the demand functions. Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) analyze the dynamical properties of gradient learning in a general class of n-person games. They derive conditions under which the process converges to an equilibrium and they illustrate their ndings for the case of a Cournot oligopoly. Both Furth (1986) and Corchon and Mas-Colell (1996) analyze a price-setting oligopoly in which rms adjust their actions using gradient learning. The uniqueness and the stability of equilibrium points are analyzed in these papers. In this paper we also consider these issues although in a discrete time setting.
The previously discussed papers consider a homogeneous setting in which each agent uses the same learning method. However, it is more reasonable to assume heterogeneity in the sense that agents apply dierent methods. Furthermore, they might switch between these methods. The switching mechanism we apply is related to reinforcement learning as in Roth and Erev (1995) and to the discrete choice model applied in Brock and Hommes (1997) . In Roth and Erev (1995) agents have many possible pure strategies and each strategy has a propensity that determines the probability of the pure strategy being applied.
These propensities depend on past payos. When a particular strategy was used in a given period, then its propensity is updated by adding the realized payo to the previous propensity. The propensities of the strategies that were not used are not updated. The probability of a pure strategy being applied is proportional to the propensity of the strategy. We also use propensities for OLS and gradient learning in the switching mechanism but they are updated dierently than in Roth and Erev (1995) : when a certain method was used, then the new propensity of that method is the weighted average of its old propensity and the current prot while the propensity of the other method remains unchanged. Furthermore, we determine the probabilities in a dierent way: we use the discrete-choice probabilities as in Brock and Hommes (1997) . This way we can control how sensitive the rms are to dierences in the performance measures. In Brock and Hommes (1997) the authors analyze a cobweb model in which agents can use either naive or perfect foresight predictors. The authors show that endogenous switching between the predictors leads to complicated dynamical phenomena as agents become more sensitive to performance dierences. Droste et al. (2002) also analyze the interaction between two dierent behavioral rules. They consider Cournot competition with best-reply and Nash rules. With the best-reply rule, rms give the best response to the average output of the previous period. Nash rms are basically perfect foresight rms that take into account the behavior of the best-reply rms. The model of this paper diers in important aspects from the setup of Droste et al. (2002) . First, rms do not know the demand they face in this paper whereas the demand functions are known in Droste et al. (2002) . Second, Droste et al. (2002) basically consider social learning: the rms observe the actions of every rm and they use this information for deciding on the production level. In contrast, rms observe only their own action and the corresponding outcome in this paper. Thus, they use individual data in the learning process instead of industry-wide variables. A consequence of this dierence is that rms that apply the same learning method or behavioral rule choose the same action in Droste et al. (2002) but they typically act dierently in the model we consider. Third, the switching methods are also dierent in the two papers. Droste et al. (2002) use replicator dynamics whereas we consider a discrete choice model, augmented with experimentation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the market structure and derive the Nash equilibrium of the model. Section 3 discusses least squares learning and gradient learning. We analyze the steady states of a homogeneous OLS-learning oligopoly both analytically and through simulations. Then we investigate the dynamical properties of the model with only gradient-learning rms. Section 4 combines the two learning methods in a heterogeneous setting. The learning rules are xed in the sense that rms apply the same learning rule during the whole simulation. We analyze the model both analytically and numerically. We compare the protability of the two learning methods as the distribution of methods over rms varies. Section 5 focuses on switching. We illustrate cyclical switching between the learning methods when the stability of gradient learning changes with the number of gradient learners. Section 6 concludes.
The proofs of the propositions are presented in the Appendix.
2 The market structure Consider a market with n rms, each producing a dierentiated good and competing in prices. The demand for the product of rm i depends on the price of good i and on the average price of the other goods. The demand is given by following nonlinear function:
where p i is the price of good i, p is the vector of prices andp −i = 1 n−1 j =i p j . All parameters are positive and we further assume that β, γ ∈ (0, 1] and β ≥ γ. Parameter α 3 species the relationship between the products: for α 3 > 0 the goods are substitutes whereas for α 3 < 0 they are complements. In this paper we focus on substitutes. 2 The demand is decreasing and convex in the own price and it is increasing and concave in the price of the other goods. The market structure is fully symmetric: rms face symmetric demands and the marginal cost of production is constant, identical across rms and equal to c.
We impose some restrictions on the parameter values which ensure that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists.
Assumption 2.1 The parameters satisfy α 1 − α 2 c β + α 3 c γ > 0 and −α 2 βc β + α 3 γc γ < 0.
2 We mention results for the case of complements too but we do not report corresponding simulations. 
The Nash equilibrium price exceeds the marginal cost.
Note that the Nash equilibrium is symmetric and the price is independent of the number of rms. This is due to the fact that the average price of other goods determines the demand so the number of rms does not aect the equilibrium.
Firms do not have full information about the market environment. In particular, they do not know the demand specications, furthermore they cannot observe either the prices or the demands for the other goods. They are assumed to know their own marginal cost. Firms repeatedly interact in the environment described above. They are myopic prot maximizers: they are only interested in maximizing their oneperiod prot. Firms can apply one of two methods to decide on the price they ask in a given period. These methods are discussed in Section 3.
Learning methods
One method that rms may apply is least squares learning. With this method rms use an estimated demand function for maximizing their expected prot. The other method is gradient learning: rms use information about their marginal prot at the current price and they adjust the current price of their good in the direction in which they expect to get a higher prot. Both methods focus on the own price eect without considering the eect of the price change of other goods. Section 3.1 presents OLS learning while gradient learning is analyzed in Section 3.2.
Least squares learning
With least squares learning rms use past price-quantity observations for estimating a perceived demand function and then they maximize their expected prot, given this perceived demand function. The pa-rameter estimates determine the price they set in the next period. As new observations become available, rms update the parameter estimates and thus the price of their good.
The learning mechanism
Firm i assumes that the demand for its good depends linearly on the price of the good but that it is independent of the price of other goods. The perceived demand function of rm i is of the form
where a i and b i are unknown parameters and ε i is a random variable with mean 0. Notice that rm i uses a misspecied model since the actual demand (1) is determined by all prices, furthermore it depends on prices in a nonlinear manner. Kirman (1983) applies the same kind of misspecied OLS learning in a
Bertand duopoly with dierentiated goods. He argues that it is reasonable for rms to disregard the prices of other goods in an oligopolistic setting. When the number of rms is large, it requires too much eort to collect every price, so rms rather focus on their own-price eect and treat the pricing behavior of the other rms as an unobservable error.
For obtaining the coecients of the perceived demand function the rm regresses the demands it faced on the prices it asked. All past observations are used with equal weight in the regression. Let a i,t and b i,t denote the parameter estimates observed by rm i at the end of period t. These estimates are given by the standard OLS formulas (see Stock and Watson (2003) , for example):
where q i,τ denotes the actual demand for good i in period τ :
Given the estimated coecients of its perceived demand function, rm i determines the price for the next period by maximizing its expected prot:
The objective function is quadratic in p i,t+1 and the quadratic term has a negative coecient if b i,t is positive. Then the perceived prot-maximizing price is
2 . Firm i asks this price in period t + 1 if the formula yields a price that exceeds c and both a i,t and b i,t are positive, or equivalently a i,t > b i,t c > 0. If these conditions do not hold, then the price is drawn from the uniform distribution on the set S = p ∈ R n + :
This set is the set of price vectors for which every rm makes a positive prot. Thus, when the perceived demand function is not sensible economically (i.e. a i,t ≤ 0 or b i,t ≤ 0), then the rm asks a random price rather than applying an incorrect pricing formula. Also, the rm asks a random but not unprotable price rather than a price that yields a certain loss.
OLS learning is implemented in the following way. For any rm i:
1. p i,1 and p i,2 are randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on set S.
2. At the end of period 2 the rm uses the OLS formulas (4) and (5) to obtain the parameter estimates a i,2 and b i,2 .
3. a. In period t ≥ 3 the rm asks the price
In every other case the price is drawn from the uniform distribution on the set S.
b. After realizing the demand, the rm updates the coecients of the perceived demand function using (4) and (5).
4. The process stops when the absolute price change is smaller than a threshold value δ for all rms:
Notice that the learning process of other rms interferes with the rm's own learning process. As the prices of other goods change, the demand the rm faces also changes. Although the change in the demand for good i is caused not only by the change in its price, rm i attributes the change in its demand solely to changes in its own price and to random noise. Therefore, the rm tries to learn a demand function that changes in every period. Learning is more complicated in the initial periods since prices are more volatile than in later periods when the learning process slows down. Brousseau and Kirman (1992) show that the misspecied OLS learning we consider does not converge in general. 4 Price changes however become smaller over time as the weight of new observations decreases.
Equilibria with OLS learning
Thus, the stopping criterion we specied will be satised at some point and the learning mechanism stops.
3 More properly: when rm i chooses a random price, then a price vector p is drawn from the uniform distribution on S and the rm will charge the i-th component of p.
4 OLS learning may converge in many other situations. Marcet and Sargent (1989) derives conditions under which OLS learning converges for a wide class of models.
We will see that the resulting point is very close to a so-called self-sustaining equilibrium in which the actual and the perceived demands of a rm coincide. The set of possible equilibria is innite.
With the method described above rms use a misspecied model since the perceived demand functions (3) dier from the actual demand functions (1). Nevertheless, rms may nd that a price results in the same actual demand as the perceived demand function predicts. If this holds for all rms, then the model is in equilibrium since the parameter estimates of the perceived demand functions do not change and rms will ask the same price in the following period. To see that this is the case, note the following. The OLS coecients at the end of period t minimize the sum of squared errors up to period t. If the perceived and the actual demands are equal at p t+1 , then the parameter estimates a t+1 and b t+1 remain the same:
under a t and b t the error corresponding to the new observation is 0 and the sum of squared errors up to period t is minimized. Thus, the sum of squared errors up to period t + 1 is minimized by exactly the same coecients. Brousseau and Kirman (1992) call this kind of equilibrium self-sustaining equilibrium since rms have no reason to believe that their perceived demand function is misspecied. Following their terminology, we refer to such equilibria as self-sustaining equilibria (SSE).
The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates a disequilibrium of the model. The solid line is the perceived inverse demand function
the dashed line depicts the actual inverse demand function The downward-sloping dotted line is the perceived marginal revenue. The quantity that maximizes the expected prot of rm i is given by the x-coordinate of the intersection of the perceived marginal revenue (MR) and the marginal cost (MC). Let q P denote this quantity. If the rm wants to face a demand equal to q P , then it has to ask price p which is determined by the value of the perceived inverse demand function at q P . However, the rm might face a dierent demand as the actual and perceived demand functions dier. Let q A denote the actual demand the rm faces when its price is p. The left panel of Figure 1 shows a situation in which the expected and the actual demands are not the same. This is not an SSE of the model. In this case the rm will add the new observation (p, q A ) to the sample and run a new regression in the next period. This new observation changes the perceived demand function and the rm will charge a dierent price. In contrast, the right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the situation when q P = q A , that is the actual and the expected demands coincide at price p. This constitutes an SSE (provided that the corresponding variables of the other rms also satisfy these conditions). The new observation does not change the coecients of the perceived demand function so the rm will charge the same price in subsequent periods.
We now describe the equilibrium conditions and the set of SSE prices. Variables p * i , a * i , and b * i , (i = 1, . . . , n) constitute an SSE if the following conditions are satised for all rms:
Condition (8) says that rms set the price that maximizes their expected prot subject to their perceived demand function. Condition (9) requires that the actual and the perceived demands are the same at the SSE prices. Since we have 2 independent equations and 3 variables for each rm, we can express a * i and b * i as a function of the SSE prices. Thus, for given prices we can nd perceived demand functions such that the rms are in an SSE. Proposition 3.1 species the coecients of the perceived demand function in terms of the SSE prices. It also describes the set of SSE prices. The proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 For given prices p * i (i = 1, . . . , n) the model is in an SSE if the coecients of the perceived demand function of rm i are given by
The set of SSE prices is described by the conditions p * i > c and This set is nonempty and bounded.
The values of a * i and b * i derived in Proposition 3.1 are in line with Proposition 3 of Kirman (1983) : they reduce to the same expression for the case of a duopoly with a linear demand function and zero marginal cost. Note that the set S coincides with the set of SSE prices. The set of SSE prices always contains the Nash equilibrium as the Nash equilibrium price exceeds the marginal cost and the corresponding demand is positive. The left panel of Figure 2 depicts the set of SSE prices for the case of two rms. This set corresponds to parameter values α 1 = 35, α 2 = 4, α 3 = 2, β = 0.7, γ = 0.6 and c = 4. We will use these parameter values in all later simulations too. For these values the Nash equilibrium price is p N ≈ 17.7693 with corresponding prot π N ≈ 223.9148.
In Proposition 3.1 we characterized the set of prices that may constitute an SSE. However, nothing ensures that every point of that set will actually be reached from some initial points. In fact, Kirman (1983) derives the set of points that can be reached with some initial values for the case of two rms and linear demand specication. He shows that this set is smaller than the set of SSE prices. 5
Simulation results
To illustrate some properties of least squares learning we simulate the model where each rm is an OLS learner. We use the aforementioned parameter values with threshold value δ = 10 −8 in the stopping 5 Kirman (1983) does not consider non-negativity constraints on ai and bi so any positive price pair can constitute an SSE in his model. criterion. First we illustrate that rms reach a point in the set of SSE prices when there are two rms. We drew 2000 random points from the uniform distribution on the set of SSE prices and ran 1000 simulations using these points as initial prices. 6 In order to save time we limited the number of runs to 10000. 7 The right panel of Figure 2 depicts the end prices of the 1000 runs. We observe that almost all of the nal points lie in the set of SSE prices and that they do not ll the whole set. Nevertheless, there is quite a variety in nal prices so homogeneous OLS learning can lead to many possible outcomes. For the case of 10 rms we observed a variety in the nal prices again and that most of the nal points lie in the set of SSE prices. This latter result is not robust to the demand parameters: when the set of SSE prices is more expanded towards high prices, then nal points fall outside the set of SSE prices more often. 8 The other nding that OLS learning may result in many possible outcomes is robust with respect to the demand parameters. These results remain valid even when we add a small noise to the actual demands. Figure 3 illustrates typical time series of prices and prots for the case of 10 rms. Although the stopping criterion is satised at period 9201, we plot only the rst 20 periods as the time series do not change much after that. We observe that prices are more volatile in the rst few periods but then they start to settle down. We analyzed the distribution of end prices by simulating the model with initial prices 6 We need two initial points for each simulation. The rst 2 points are used as initial values in the rst simulation, the third and the fourth are used in the second one etc. 7 So the simulation stopped at period 10000 even if the stopping criterion was not met. Based on other simulations, this does not aect the outcome substantially. 8 Simulations show that if we do not consider the non-negativity constraint on demands, then almost all points lie within the set of SSE prices irrespective of the shape of the set.
drawn from the uniform distribution on the set of SSE prices. As the number of rms increases, a higher proportion of end prices lies close to the mode that exceeds the Nash equilibrium price.
Gradient learning
Let us now turn to the other method that rms may apply for deciding on prices. Instead of assuming a specic form for the demand function and estimating its parameters, rms use information about the slope of their prot function. 9 Knowing the slope at the current price, rms adjust the price of their good in the direction in which they expect to get a higher prot.
The learning mechanism
The price of rm i in period t + 1 is given by
where the derivative of the prot function is
. Formula (10) shows that the price adjustment depends on the slope of the prot function and on parameter λ. In Section 3.2.2 we will see that the stability properties of this learning rule depend heavily on the value of λ.
We augment this method with an additional rule. Note that if a rm sets a too high price for which the demand is zero, then (10) gives the same price for the next period since the slope of the prot function is zero at that point. However, it should be clear for the rms that the zero prot may result from charging a too high price, so it can be reasonable to lower the price. Therefore, we add the following rule to gradient learning: if a rm faced zero demand in two consecutive periods, then it lowers its previous price by λ 0 .
This rule ensures that rms cannot get stuck in the zero prot region. We assume that λ 0 takes the same value as λ in all simulations. 10 Gradient learning is implemented in the following way. For every rm i:
1. p i,1 and p i,2 are drawn from the uniform distribution on the set S. 11 9 For analytically calculating the slope rms would need to know the actual demand function and the prices asked by other rms. Nevertheless, with market experiments they can get a good estimate of the slope without having the previously mentioned pieces of information. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that rms know the slope of their prot function. 10 The exact value of λ0 aects only the speed of return from the zero prot region, it does not aect the convergence properties of the method. 11 Although it would be sucient to take one initial value for the simulations, we take two initial values so that gradient learning would be more comparable with OLS learning in a heterogeneous setting. We take initial values from the same set for the same reason.
2. In period t ≥ 3:
, c .
• If D i (p t−2 ) = D i (p t−1 ) = 0, then the price is given by p i,t = max {p i,t−1 − λ 0 , c} .
3. The process continues until all price changes are smaller in absolute value than a threshold value δ.
Similarly to the case of OLS-learning rms, the rms' learning processes interfere with each other. Although a rm moves in the direction that is expected to yield a higher prot, it may actually face a lower prot after the price change since the prot function of the rm changes due to the price change of other rms.
Nevertheless, if gradient learning converges, then this disturbance becomes less severe as there will be only small price changes in later periods.
Equilibrium and local stability
Let us now investigate the dynamical properties of gradient learning. In the rst part of the analysis we will not consider non-negativity constraints on prices and demands and we disregard the augmenting rule.
We will discuss the eects of these modications after deriving the general features of the learning rule.
The law of motion of prices is given by
The system is in a steady state if the derivative of the prot function with respect to the own price is zero for all rms. Under the demand specication we consider, this condition characterizes the Nash equilibrium, so the Nash equilibrium is the unique steady state of the model with only gradient learners.
Let us now analyze the stability of the steady state. Proposition 3.2 summarizes the dynamical properties of the gradient-learning oligopoly. The proof of the proposition can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.2 The Nash equilibrium price p N is locally stable in the gradient-learning oligopoly if
The primary bifurcation is a period-doubling bifurcation: n − 1 eigenvalues become −1, the remaining eigenvalue lies within the unit circle.
According to Proposition 3.2, the steady state is locally stable if the parameter λ is suciently small. At the bifurcation value of λ a locally stable 2-cycle emerges. Since the steady state and the two-cycle are only locally stable, we might not observe convergence in a simulation when prices are not suciently close to the steady state or the 2-cycle. Note that the coecient of λ in the stability condition is decreasing in n as p N is independent of n. Thus, an increase in the number of rms has a stabilizing eect.
So far we have not considered the eect of the constraints p i ≥ c, D i (p) ≥ 0 and the augmenting rule that lowers too high prices. For discussing these eects let us rst consider a linear demand function (i.e. β = γ = 1). In that case the system is linear so there are three kinds of possible dynamics if we do not consider any constraints: convergence to a steady state, to a 2-cycle or unbounded divergence. Unbounded divergence is no longer possible when we impose the constraints on prices and demands. These constraints and the augmenting rule drive prices back towards the region where the demands are positive. Therefore, we may observe high-period cycles, quasi-periodic or aperiodic dynamics for high values of λ.
In the nonlinear setting we consider, the non-negativity constraint on prices must be imposed since a negative price yields a complex number as demand. The eect of the constraints and the augmenting rule is the same as for a linear demand function: unbounded divergence cannot occur, we observe high-period cycles, quasi-periodic dynamics or aperiodic time series instead.
Simulation results
We run simulations for illustrating the possible dynamics of the model with only gradient learners. We use the same parameter values as before. Figure 4 illustrates typical time series of prices: convergence to the Nash equilibrium for λ = 0.8 in panel (a), quasi-periodic dynamics for λ = 0.9344 in panel (b), aperiodic dynamics for λ = 1 in panel (c) and high-period cycles for λ = 10 in panel (d). These patterns can occur for dierent demand parameters too but for dierent values of λ. In line with Proposition 3.2, we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium price when λ is suciently small. For higher values of λ we observe high-period cycles, quasi-periodic or aperiodic dynamics. The bifurcation value of λ, for which the locally stable 2-cycle emerges, is around λ * ≈ 0.9391. 12
It turns out from simulations that the lower λ is, the larger the range of initial prices for which convergence can be observed in simulations. So when the steady state is locally stable and λ is close to the bifurcation value, then we observe convergence only for a small set of initial prices. When initial prices lie outside of this set, then we observe high-period cycles, quasi-periodic or aperiodic dynamics. 12 We cannot observe this two cycle in simulations for two reasons. First, it is locally stable exactly at the bifurcation value λ = λ * , for which we can get an approximate value only. Second, the 2-cycle is only locally stable, so we could observe it only if the prices are suciently close to it. 
Heterogeneous oligopoly with xed learning rules
In this section we combine the learning methods discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and we consider the case of a heterogeneous oligopoly in which some rms use least squares learning while others apply gradient learning. Firms use a xed learning method and they cannot change the rule they use. We will see that the main features of the two methods remain valid even in the heterogeneous setting: when λ is suciently small, then OLS learners get close to an SSE in which gradient learners give the best response to the prices set by the other rms.
Steady states and stability
Consider a market with n O OLS learners and n − n O gradient learners where 0 < n O < n. Let us assume without loss of generality that the rst n O rms are the OLS learners. We discussed in Section 3.1.2 that the steady states of an OLS-learning oligopoly are characterized by a self-sustaining equilibrium. The same conditions must hold for OLS learners in a steady state of a heterogeneous oligopoly: their actual and perceived demands must coincide at the price they ask (given the prices of other rms), otherwise they would update their perceived demand function and the price of their good would change in the next period. At the same time, the slope of the prot function of gradient learners must be zero in a steady state otherwise the price of their good would change. Proposition 4.1 characterizes the steady state of the heterogeneous oligopoly with xed learning rules. We leave the proof to the reader, it can be proved with very similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 4.1 In a steady state of the system, OLS learners are in an SSE and gradient learners give the best response to the prices set by other rms. The price p G set by gradient learners is characterized by
where p * s denotes the price of OLS learner s.
Later we will illustrate with numerical analysis that there is a unique solution p G to the above equation.
Since, at a steady state, gradient learners give the best-response price, steady states are similar to a Stackelberg oligopoly outcome with OLS learners as leaders and gradient learners as followers. It is, however, not a real Stackelberg outcome because OLS learners do not behave as real leaders since they do not take into account the reaction function of gradient learners when setting the price of their good.
Nevertheless, OLS learners may earn a higher prot than gradient learners in a steady state. 13 Let us now turn to the stability of the steady states. As OLS learners always settle down at a certain price since the weight of a new observation decreases as the number of observations increases, stability depends mainly on the dynamical properties of gradient learning. Proposition 4.2 presents these properties.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
13 Gal-Or (1985) shows that there is a second mover advantage in a price-setting duopoly with substitute goods. Under a linear demand specication, this result can be extended to a higher number of rms too. We expect this to hold also for the nonlinear demand specication we consider when the demand functions are not too far from the linear case. However, since OLS learners do not charge the optimal leaders' price, this deviation from the optimal price may hurt the gradient learners even more and they may earn a lower prot than OLS learners.
Proposition 4.2 Under the assumption that OLS learners have reached their steady state price, the dynamical properties of gradient learning are as follows. For 0 < n O < n − 1 the price p G set by gradient learners is locally stable if 0 < λM 1 < 2 and 0 < λM 2 < 2, where
s is the average OLS price. For n O = n − 1 the price set by the gradient learner is locally stable if
The primary bifurcation is a period-doubling bifurcation.
Note that the previous proposition concerns the stability of the price set by gradient learners and not those of the steady states. Although OLS learners get close to an SSE and the price set by gradient learners is locally stable for low values of λ, we cannot say that the steady state is locally stable. A small perturbation of a steady state leads to dierent OLS prices and this changes the best-response price too.
If, however, the OLS prices remained the same, then gradient learners would return to the best-response price after a small perturbation. Note further that the proposition mentions local stability. Thus, we might not observe convergence to a steady state even if the price set by gradient learners is locally stable.
The distribution of learning methods over rms aects the stability of the price set by gradient learners
as n O appears in the aforementioned stability conditions. It is, however, not clear analytically how stability changes with respect to n O because a change in n O aects the average OLS pricep * , which can take many dierent values. For further analyzing this issue, we use numerical calculations. First we check the direct eect of n O on stability and then we analyze how an increase in n O aects the average OLS price.
Although OLS prices are unknown, we can make use of the fact that the set of SSE prices is bounded:
the minimal SSE price is c and the maximal SSE pricep is dened by α 1 + α 3p γ − α 2p β = 0 (as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1). Thus, we have c ≤p * ≤p. Taking values forp * from this range, we can calculate p G , M 1 and M 2 numerically. The left panel of Figure 5 shows that p G is unique (given the average OLS price and the number of OLS learners). Note that there is a value ofp * for which the best-response price is the same irrespective of the number of OLS learners. This price equals the Nash equilibrium price since the best response to the Nash equilibrium price is the Nash equilibrium price itself.
It turns out from the calculations that only M 2 is relevant for stability: M 1 is always positive and
Using (12) we can calculate for anyp * and any n O the threshold value of λ for which the gradient learners' price loses stability. At that point a period-doubling bifurcation occurs. 14 Using these threshold values, we depict the stability-instability region for dierent values of n O in the right panel of Figure 5 . We can see from the graph that for a given average OLS price, the region of stability is increasing (decreasing) in n O if the average OLS price is larger (smaller) than the Nash equilibrium price and if there are more than one gradient learners (i.e. n O < n − 1). 15 Thus, for a xed average OLS price, an increase in the number of OLS learners has a (de)stabilizing eect if the average OLS price is larger (smaller) than the Nash equilibrium price and if there are at least 2 gradient learners. For n O = n − 1 the stability condition becomes dierent. When the average OLS price exceeds the Nash equilibrium price, then the change in the stability region is still monotonic, but it is no longer monotonic when the average OLS price is lower than the Nash equilibrium price.
As the number of OLS learners changes, the average OLS price changes too. Sincep * may change in any direction, we cannot say unambiguously whether a change in n O has a stabilizing or a destabilizing eect on the price set by gradient learners. For analyzing how the average OLS price changes as n O varies, we run 1000 simulations for each value of n O between 1 and 9 with initial prices drawn from the set of SSE prices. Letp i,j denote the average OLS price in run i with j OLS learners, where i = 1, . . . , 1000
and j = 1, . . . , 9. 16 We used λ = 0.937 in these simulations: for this value of λ the convergence property of gradient learning changes as n O varies. The simulations show that the average OLS pricep i,j exceeds the Nash equilibrium price in 64 − 71% of the runs for dierent number of OLS learners. We analyzed 14 At the threshold value of λ, it holds that λM2 = 2. From the proof of Proposition 4.2 it is clear that the smallest eigenvalue becomes −1 in this case. 15 Remember that there is a dierent stability condition for the case nO = n − 1. 16 We used the same initial prices in a xed run i for the dierent values of j. i,j . The minimal value was 18.3097 (for j = 5) and the maximal value was 18.3778 (for j = 2). The means for dierent number of OLS learners do not dier from each other signicantly at the 5% level. Based on the ndings that average OLS prices are typically larger than the Nash equilibrium price and that they do not vary much as the number of OLS learners changes, we conclude that an increase in the number of OLS learners has typically (but not necessarily) a destabilizing eect on gradient learning.
The stability analysis becomes much simpler for the case of complements (α 3 < 0). In that case it is easy to see that 0 < M 2 < M 1 so the relevant stability condition becomes M 1 < 2. Numerical calculations show that the value of M 1 monotonically decreases in the number of OLS learners irrespective of the average OLS price. Thus, an increase in the number of OLS learners has a stabilizing eect on the best response price when the average OLS price is xed. Overall, the relation between stability and the distribution of learning methods over rms is stronger for complements than for substitutes.
Simulation results
First we simulate the model for 2 rms with rm 1 as gradient learner and rm 2 as OLS learner. We used λ = λ 0 = 0.5 in the simulations. The price set by the gradient-learning rm is locally stable for this choice of λ. We run 1000 simulations with initial prices drawn from the uniform distribution on the set of SSE prices. Figure 6 depicts the end prices and the set of SSE prices. The OLS learner indeed gets close to an SSE in almost all cases: 99.7% of the points lie in the set of SSE prices. The structure of the end points also conrms that the gradient learner gives the best response price: the points lie close to the reaction curve of the gradient learner. from the uniform distribution on the set of SSE prices. We let each simulation run for 2000 periods and for each rm we considered the average of its prots over the last 100 periods as the prot of the rm in the given simulation. 17 Thus, for the case of k OLS learners, we had 1000k observations for OLS prots and 1000(10 − k) observations for gradient prots. We calculated the average and the standard deviation of these values separately for OLS and gradient learners. The condence interval is calculated as mean ± 2stdev/ √ 1000k and mean ± 2stdev/ 1000(10 − k) for OLS and gradient learners respectively.
The left panel shows that gradient learning yields signicantly lower average prot than OLS learning when the number of OLS learners is low. In contrast, it gives signicantly higher prots when the number of OLS learners is high enough.
The right panel of Figure 7 depicts for each number of OLS learners the percentage of the 1000 simulations in which the average gradient prot was larger than the average OLS prot. The graph shows that gradient learning becomes more protable than OLS learning more often as the number of OLS learners increases. Since protability is closely related to the convergence properties of gradient learning, this illustrates that an increase in the number of OLS learners has typically a stabilizing eect. 18 Based on this change in the stability of gradient learning, we conjecture a cyclical switching between 17 2000 periods are typically enough for prots to converge when gradient learning converges. We take the average over the last 100 periods in order to get a better view on the protability of the methods. When gradient learning converges, then prots do not vary much in the last periods. When the price is unstable, gradient prots change more or less periodically, so averaging over the last few prots describes the protability of the method better than considering only the last prot. 18 When gradient learning does not converge, then it gives low average prot as the price uctuates between too low and too high values. Therefore, when the average gradient prots are high, the best-response price must be locally stable and gradient learning must converge. the learning methods when rms are allowed to choose which method they want to apply. Conjecture 4.3 summarizes our expectation. In the following section we will investigate if cyclical switching occurs.
Conjecture 4.3 When rms are sensitive to prot dierences, changes in the convergence properties of gradient learning may lead to cyclical switching between the learning rules. When gradient learning converges, OLS learners have an incentive to switch to gradient learning as it typically yields a higher prot. This increase in the number of gradient learners, however, may destabilize the best-response price, resulting in lower gradient prots. Then rms switch to OLS learning, so gradient learning may converge again and the cycle may repeat itself.
Endogenous switching between learning mechanisms
We introduce competition between the learning rules in this section. We extend the model by allowing for endogenous switching between the two methods: rms may choose from the two learning rules in each period. For deciding about the rules, rms take into account their performance: the probability of choosing a specic method is positively related to the past prots realized while using that method. Section 5.1 species the switching mechanism, the simulation results are discussed in Section 5.2. The simulations conrm that the cyclical switching we conjectured occurs.
5.1
The switching mechanism
The switching mechanism is based on reinforcement learning as in Roth and Erev (1995) and it is related to the discrete choice model as in Brock and Hommes (1997) . The mechanism is augmented with experimentation too. Every rm i has a performance measure for each of the rules. These measures determine the probability of rm i applying a certain rule. Performances depend on past realized prots. Let o i,t (g i,t ) denote the performance of OLS (gradient) learning perceived by rm i at the end of period t. The performance measure for OLS learning is updated in each period in the following way:
where w ∈ (0, 1] is the weight of the latest prot in the performance measure. The performance of gradient learning is updated analogously. The initial performances are the rst prots that were realized using the method in question for each rm. Thus, performance measures are basically weighted averages of past prots realized by the given method where weights decay geometrically.
These performance measures determine the probability of applying a learning method in the following way. Firm i applies OLS learning in period t + 1 with probability
where ω ≥ 0 measures how sensitive the rms are to dierences in the performance measures and η is the probability of experimentation. The higher ω is, the higher the probability of applying the method with the higher performance. For ω = 0 rms choose both methods with 50% probability. When ω = +∞, then rms choose the method with the higher performance with probability 1 − η. The interpretation of (13) is that the choice is based on the performance dierence between the methods with probability 1 − 2η and the rm randomizes with equal probabilities between the methods with probability 2η.
The model with endogenous switching is implemented as follows.
1. p i,1 and p i,2 are drawn from the uniform distribution on the set S, for each i.
2. In period 3, k randomly chosen rms apply OLS learning, the other rms use gradient learning. OLS and gradient prices are determined by the learning mechanisms discussed in Section 3. ) denotes the prot of rm i that was earned while using OLS (gradient) learning in period 3 or 4.
b. Firms choose a method for the following period: rm i applies OLS learning in period 5 with probability P OLS i,5 .
In period t ≥ 5 :
a. Prices are determined by the two learning mechanisms. The performance measures o t and g t are updated.
b. Firm i chooses OLS learning for period t + 1 with probability P OLS i,t+1 .
5. The process stops when a predened number of periods T is reached.
In the simulations of the following section we use w = 0.5, ω = 25 and η = 0.005. We simulate the model for T = 10000 periods.
Learning cycles
First we shortly discuss the results of simulations when the convergence properties of gradient learning do not change as the distribution of learning methods over rms varies and then we illustrate cyclical switching. When gradient learning always converges (i.e. for any number of OLS learners), then OLS learning need not be driven out even if the rms are very sensitive to performance dierences. Some rms may earn a high OLS prot and they apply OLS learning not only due to experimentation but in many consecutive periods. However, the number of OLS learners is typically low. In contrast, when gradient learning diverges fast and rms are suciently sensitive to performance dierences, then gradient learning is driven out by OLS learning. Firms apply gradient learning only due to experimentation, each rm uses OLS learning in almost every period. When rms are less sensitive to dierences in the performance measures, then gradient learning is used more often but OLS learning is applied in the vast majority of the periods. Now let us consider the case when the convergence properties of gradient learning change as the distribution of learning methods over rms varies. First we illustrate cyclical switching in a duopoly because it is easier to see what drives the rms' switching behavior when the number of rms is low. Then we show that cyclical switching occurs for higher number of rms too. We use the same demand and cost parameters as before. Figure 8 depicts typical time series of prices and the corresponding performance measures for the case of two rms. We used λ = 0.85 and k = 1 in the simulation. Gradient learning is stable for this value of λ only if one rm uses it. In the rst third of the illustrated periods rm 1 uses mainly OLS learning while rm 2 is a gradient learner. Firm 1 tries gradient learning in one period but it immediately switches back to OLS learning as the latter performs better. This change in the price of rm 1 drives away the price of rm 2 from the best-response price and it takes a few periods until the gradient learner reaches the optimal price again. Later rm 1 tries gradient learning again and this induces a change in prices after which the rm becomes a gradient learner. When both rms apply gradient learning, prices start an oscillating divergence. At some point the performance of gradient learning becomes worse than that of OLS learning and rm 1 switches back to OLS learning. This ends the rst oscillating part. Gradient learning, however, becomes more protable again for rm 1 and another oscillating part starts. This part ends in the same way: rm 1 switches back to OLS learning after which the price set by rm 2 starts to converge. The last oscillating part starts by rm 2 switching to OLS learning. The price set by rm 2 decreases which yields a lower prot for rm 1. Because of this rm 1 switches to gradient learning.
Cyclical switching can occur for higher number of rms too. Figure 9 illustrates this for 10 rms with λ = 0.95 and k = 5. We can observe both diverging and converging phases for gradient learners which
shows that the stability of the method changes. This change is related to the number of OLS learners. In the rst periods, the number of OLS learners is high and we observe convergence of the gradient learner's price. Then some OLS learners switch to gradient learning, which is reected in the drop in n O . As the time series of prices show, gradient learning becomes unstable. After that the number of OLS learners starts increasing gradually until it reaches the level n O = 9, for which the gradient price shows a converging pattern again. Then rms start switching to gradient learning again, which destabilizes the price. We could nd evidence for cyclical switching for the case of complements too.
Cyclical switching may occur only if the value of parameter λ is such that gradient learning converges when there are few gradient learners and it diverges otherwise. For any parameter values that satisfy properties of the methods. Therefore it is important to know which properties are robust to heterogeneity.
In this paper we have analyzed the interaction between least squares learning and gradient learning in a Bertrand oligopoly with dierentiated goods where rms do not know the demand specication and they use one of the two methods for determining the price of their good. These learning methods have been widely used for modeling learning behavior in oligopolistic markets, but mainly in a homogeneous setup. The methods are not exceptional in the sense that other learning methods may lead to similar results: best response learning, for example, would yield similar outcomes in the current model as a stable gradient learning.
We have analyzed four dierent setups. In a pure OLS-learning oligopoly rms move towards a selfsustaining equilibrium in which their expected and actual demands coincide at the prices they charge.
The set of SSE prices contains innitely many points including the Nash equilibrium of the model. The initial conditions determine which point is reached in the long run. We formally prove that rms reach the Nash equilibrium when every rm applies gradient learning and the method converges. When gradient learning does not converge, then it leads to high-period cycles, quasi-periodic or aperiodic dynamics.
In a heterogeneous oligopoly with rms applying a xed learning method, we have analytically derived that the dynamical properties of gradient learning depend on the distribution of learning methods over rms. Numerical analysis shows that an increase in the number of OLS learners can have a stabilizing eect. When gradient learning converges, then OLS learners move towards a self-sustaining equilibrium in which gradient learners give the best response to the prices of other rms. When endogenous switching between the learning methods is introduced in the model, then a stable gradient learning may not always drive out OLS learning: some OLS learners may nd OLS learning to be more protable for them. OLS learning, however, may drive out gradient learning when the latter never converges. When the convergence properties and the protability of gradient learning changes as the distribution of learning methods over rms varies, a cyclical switching between the learning methods may be observed. Gradient learners tend to switch to OLS learning when gradient learning does not converge and thus gives low prots. This decrease in the number of gradient learners can stabilize the method, resulting in higher prots. This can give an incentive for OLS learners to switch back to gradient learning. Gradient learning, however, may lose its stability again and the cycle may repeat itself.
The previous analysis can be extended in several ways. Observations could have dierent weights in the OLS formulas. Since observations of the early periods are less informative about the demand function due to the volatility of the prices of other rms, it might be reasonable to introduce a weighting function that gives less weight to older observations. Furthermore, one might consider dierent perceived demand functions such as higher-order polynomials. It might also be reasonable to change the information that is available to rms. If rms observe the price of some but not all of the goods, then they may take this extra information into account for estimating the demand parameters. The step size parameter of gradient learning could be endogenized such that the method would stabilize itself automatically when prices start to diverge. Other learning methods such as best-response learning, ctitious play or imitation could also be applied in the current setup. We could add less myopic decision makers to the model such as perfect foresight rms or rms that are actively learning, i.e. rms that want to maximize a discounted sum of prots. Moreover, learning in more complex environments where rms make not only a price or quantity choice but they also need to make investment, quality or location decisions, can be studied as well along the lines outlined in this paper.
Subtracting (15) from (16) yields
The rst two terms are positive as p i > p j and all parameters are positive. We will now show that the last term is also positive. Let g(x) = (x − c)x β−1 . This function is increasing if x ≥ c : g (x) = βx β−1 − c(β − 1)x β−2 > 0 for x > c(1 − 1 β ). 21 This proves that the last term is also positive as p i > p j . This, however, leads to a contradiction as positive numbers cannot add up to zero. So we must have p i = p j : rms charge the same price in a Nash equilibrium. Let p denote the corresponding price. Then (14) gives
We will now show that there is a unique solution to this equation and the corresponding price is larger than the marginal cost. According to Assumption 2.1, f (c) = α 1 − α 2 c β + α 3 c γ > 0. Note that f (p)
becomes negative for high values of p : . Assumption 2.1 ensures that the sum of the rst two terms is negative.
The last term is also negative when p > c. Thus, f (p) is strictly decreasing in p for p > c. Since f (p) is continuous, this proves that there is a unique solution to f (p) = 0. Let p N denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium price. It follows easily from the proof that p N > c and the demands are positive in the Nash equilibrium.
We will show that the second order condition is satised. Dierentiating (14) First we derive the coecients of the perceived demand functions in an SSE in terms of the SSE prices and then we study which prices may constitute an SSE. 21 We will see later that the condition x ≥ c holds for the Nash equilibrium price.
From (9) we get a * i = D i (p * ) + b * i p * i . Combining this expression with (8) yields
Using (18) we can express a * i as
The above described values constitute an SSE only if the inverse demand functions are sensible. That is, the following conditions need to be satised for all rms:
Conditions (20) and (21) ensure that the perceived demand functions are downward-sloping with a positive intercept. Conditions (22) and (23) require that the perceived and the actual inverse demands are larger than the marginal cost at q i = 0. Condition (24) species that the SSE prices should be larger than the marginal cost. We will show that some of these constraints are redundant.
Conditions (20) and (21) This set is nonempty: the Nash equilibrium price, for example, satises the above condition. The maximal SSE price of rm i increases in the price of other rms. Thus, the upper bound of the SSE prices is given by the pricep for which the demand is 0 if every rm charges this price: α 1 − α 2p β + α 3p γ = 0.
The existence and uniqueness of this price can be shown in the same way as for the Nash equilibrium price. Let us consider a heterogeneous setting in which n O rms apply OLS learning and the remaining n − n O rms use gradient learning. The proof of Proposition 3.2 follows from this general case by setting n O = 0.
In the proofs we will apply a lemma about the eigenvalues of a matrix that has a special structure.
First we will prove this lemma and then we prove Propositions 3.2 and 4.2.
Lemma 6.1 Consider an n × n matrix with diagonal entries d ∈ R and o-diagonal entries o ∈ R. In case of n = 1 the matrix has one eigenvalue: µ = d. If n > 1, then there are two distinct eigenvalues: The proof of Lemma 6.1
The case n = 1 is trivial so we focus on n > 1. Let A denote the matrix in question. Due to its special structure, A can be expressed as A = (d − o)I n + o1 n , where I n is the n−dimensional identity matrix and 1 n is the n-dimensional matrix of ones.
First note that if λ is an eigenvalue of o1 n with corresponding eigenvector x, then x is an eigenvector of A for the eigenvalue
It is easy to see that o1 n has two distinct eigenvalues: o · n with multiplicity 1 and 0 with multiplicity n − 1. Thus, A has two distinct eigenvalues: µ 1 = d − o + o · n = d + (n − 1)o with multiplicity 1 and µ 2 = d − o with multiplicity n − 1.
Now the dynamical properties of the heterogeneous oligopoly can be studied in the following way.
Suppose that the rst n O rms are OLS learners and the remaining n − n O rms are gradient learners.
Suppose that OLS prices have settled down at some level and let p * i denote the price of OLS learner i (i = 1, . . . , n O ).
Since OLS prices have settled down, the law of motion of the prices set by OLS learners can be approximated by p i,t+1 = p i,t for i = 1, . . . , n O as price changes become smaller as the number of observations increases. The law of motion of the price set by gradient learners is given by p j,t+1 = p j,t + λ ∂π j (pt) ∂p j,t for j = n O + 1, . . . , n. Then the Jacobian (evaluated at the steady state) is of the following form:
where I is the n O × n O identity matrix, 0 is an n O × (n − n O ) matrix of zeros, B is an (n − n O ) × n O
